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STREAMLINING THE CORRUPTION DEFENSE: 
A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR FCPA-ICSID 
INTERACTION 
MICHAEL A. LOSCO† 
ABSTRACT 
  Over the past decade, the number of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(FCPA) enforcement actions has soared, as has the number of cases 
before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID). At the same time, events have demonstrated that two 
problems may arise from the lack of coordination between 
anticorruption investigations and ICSID arbitration proceedings. 
First, anticorruption investigations may reveal arbitral decisions to be 
incorrect due to a lack of evidence regarding corruption in the 
formation of investment contracts. Second, the “corruption 
defense”—an emerging affirmative defense that allows host states to 
invoke corruption in the formation of investment contracts as an 
absolute bar to liability—creates a perverse incentive that encourages 
states to expropriate investors’ assets, or to renegotiate for 
burdensome new terms, following FCPA investigations. 
  This Note explores the characteristics of the corruption defense as 
applied by ICSID tribunals, including the evidentiary burden placed 
upon the host state to assert the defense.  It then proposes a 
framework for FCPA-ICSID interaction designed to strengthen the 
defense and to further the goal of eradicating global corruption. It 
proposes using tools such as waiver and disgorgement, contract cure, 
and communication between FCPA enforcement authorities and 
ICSID tribunals to remedy the problems identified above. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1996, Siemens AG (Siemens) won a $1 billion concession for 
services related to the production of an Argentine national 
 
Copyright © 2014 Michael A. Losco. 
 † Duke University School of Law, J.D./LL.M. in International and Comparative Law 
expected 2014; Georgetown University, B.A. 2010. 
LOSCO IN PP CLEAN (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/26/2014  7:24 PM 
1202 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1201 
 
identification card.1 The contract between Siemens and the Argentine 
government was governed by a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) 
between Germany and Argentina.2 Not three years later, a number of 
factors—including skyrocketing sovereign debt and the pegging of the 
Argentine peso to the U.S. dollar—converged to cause the Argentine 
economy to contract rapidly.3 In an effort to keep the economy afloat, 
the legislature passed the “Economic-Financial Emergency Law” 
allowing the president to renegotiate or terminate any government 
contracts.4 The government halted parts of the identification card 
project and imposed new, nonnegotiable contract terms amidst rapid 
turnover of government officials.5 Siemens brought an arbitration 
claim against Argentina before the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), alleging that the 
country’s actions constituted an expropriation of its investment.6 The 
ICSID tribunal found that Argentina’s actions over the course of the 
crisis constituted a “creeping” expropriation and a violation of the 
state’s duties of full protection and fair and equitable treatment of 
foreign investment.7 It ordered Argentina to compensate Siemens in 
the amount of $217 million.8 The issue of corruption never arose 
during the proceedings, as there was no evidence to suggest that any 
such activity had taken place. 
Shortly after the tribunal issued its award, however, “German 
prosecutors discovered Siemens had engaged in rather astonishing 
acts of systematic bribery around the world.”9 Siemens had procured 
 
 1. R. Zachary Torres-Fowler, Note, Undermining ICSID: How the Global Antibribery 
Regime Impairs Investor-State Arbitration, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 995, 1027 (2012). 
 2. Siemens AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, ¶ 78 (Feb. 6, 
2007), 14 ICSID Rep. 518 (2009). For a discussion of bilateral investment treaties, see infra Part 
I.A. 
 3. Peter Katel, Argentina’s Crisis Explained, TIME (Dec. 20, 2001), http://content.time.com
/time/world/article/0,8599,189393,00.html. 
 4. Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, ¶ 96. 
 5. Id. ¶¶ 91–97. In a take-it-or-leave-it deal, Argentina proposed halving both the 
duration of the contract and the number of identification cards to be issued and eliminating its 
obligation to stop issuing the old type of identification card. Id. ¶¶ 97, 112. Siemens did not 
accept the terms of the new proposal and Argentina ultimately terminated the contract pursuant 
to a decree issued under the Economic-Financial Emergency Law. Id. ¶ 97. 
 6. Id. ¶ 213. For a list of measures that Siemens alleged constituted expropriation of its 
investment, see id. ¶ 218. 
 7. Id. ¶¶ 262–65, 273, 308–09. 
 8. Torres-Fowler, supra note 1, at 1027. 
 9. Id. 
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the Argentine contract after paying $105 million in bribes to 
Argentine officials over the course of a decade.10 Siemens pleaded 
guilty to violating the accounting provisions of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA),11 and it subsequently waived the $217 million 
award.12 Its precise reasons for doing so remain unclear. As a result of 
its guilty plea, Siemens became the subject of the largest criminal 
penalty ($450 million) and the largest disgorgement of profits ($350 
million) in FCPA history.13 Even today, its total settlement of $800 
million is double the amount of the third largest settlement in FCPA 
history.14 
These events demonstrate that investment contracts procured 
through bribery or fraud may become the subject of an FCPA 
investigation as well as an ICSID dispute. Prosecutions under the 
FCPA have exploded in the past decade, as have investor-state suits 
before ICSID tribunals.15 Unfortunately, the regimes do not have a 
mechanism for communicating with one another. Siemens’s waiver of 
the $217 million ICSID award in its favor highlights just one problem 
that can emerge from a lack of communication between FCPA 
enforcement authorities and ICSID tribunals. 
This Note seeks to address two problems arising from the lack of 
coordination between FCPA enforcement authorities and ICSID 
tribunals. First, as shown by Siemens AG v. Argentine Republic,16 
anticorruption investigations may reveal arbitral decisions to be 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2012). 
 12. Luke Eric Peterson, Siemens Waives Rights Under Arbitral Award Against Argentina; 
Company’s Belated Corruption Confessions Had Led Argentina To Seek Revision of 2007 
Ruling, INVESTMENT ARB. REP., Sept. 2, 2009, § 10; Letter from Steven A. Tyrrell, Chief, Fraud 
Section, Criminal Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Scott W. Muller and Angela T. Burgess, Davis 
Polk & Wardwell (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/
siemens.pdf; Richard L. Cassin, Final Settlements for Siemens, FCPA BLOG (Dec. 15, 2008, 7:22 
PM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2008/12/16/final-settlements-for-siemens.html. 
 13. Cassin, supra note 12; Richard L. Cassin, Total Lands Third on the Top 10 
Disgorgement List, FCPA BLOG (May 31, 2013, 8:02 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/
blog/2013/5/31/total-lands-third-on-the-top-10-disgorgement-list.html. 
 14. Richard L. Cassin, With Magyar in New Top Ten, It’s 90% Non-U.S., FCPA BLOG 
(Dec. 29, 2011, 1:28 PM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/12/29/with-magyar-in-new-top-
ten-its-90-non-us.html. In 2010, the U.K. company BAE Systems agreed to the third largest 
settlement, which included a $400 million criminal fine. Id. 
 15. See infra notes 54–55, 58–61 and accompanying text. 
 16. Siemens AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award (Feb. 6, 2007), 
14 ICSID Rep. 518 (2009). 
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incorrect due to a lack of evidence regarding corruption in the 
formation of investment contracts. Second, the corruption defense 
creates a perverse incentive that encourages states to expropriate 
investors’ assets—or to renegotiate for burdensome new terms—
following FCPA investigations.17 The implications of these problems 
are not merely jurisprudential, but can be measured in billions of 
dollars. 
The relationship between the international investment regime 
and anticorruption efforts around the globe has been the subject of 
some recent scholarship,18 but little attention has been devoted to the 
lack of coordination between the two. In particular, little scholarly 
attention has been devoted to analyzing the contours of an emerging 
affirmative defense that allows host states to invoke corruption in the 
formation of investment contracts as an absolute bar to liability.19 
Moreover, commentators analyzing the corruption defense have 
generally forgone a topical approach to the defense in favor of a case-
by-case assessment.20 This Note examines the components of the 
corruption defense as applied by tribunals. It then addresses the 
problem of inaccurate arbitral awards due to insufficient evidence of 
corruption, and it proposes a novel solution to the problem of 
perverse incentives for host states. 
Part I of this Note traces the development and functions of the 
overlapping ICSID and FCPA regimes. Part II explores the elements 
of the emerging corruption defense as applied by ICSID tribunals, 
including the evidentiary burden placed upon the host state for 
asserting the defense. Because a strong corruption defense is essential 
to the worthy goal of eradicating global corruption, Part III of this 
Note proposes a framework for FCPA-ICSID interaction designed to 
strengthen the defense and further that goal. With the aim of 
promoting justice and transparency, Part III proposes using tools such 
 
 17. See infra Part III. 
 18. E.g., Rashna Bhojwani, Note, Deterring Global Bribery: Where Public and Private 
Enforcement Collide, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 66 (2012); Torres-Fowler, supra note 1.  
 19. For further discussion of the defense, see infra Part II. 
 20. See, e.g., Bhojwani, supra note 18, at 108–11 (advocating that FCPA enforcers should 
consider the totality of the case, including arbitration awards); Torres-Fowler, supra note 1, at 
1034–37 (proposing taking into account factors on a case-by-case basis instead of “extensive 
reforms”). But see Jason Webb Yackee, Essay, Investment Treaties and Investor Corruption: An 
Emerging Defense for Host States?, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 723, 736–42 (2012) (examining the 
principle of good faith and “in accordance” provisions). 
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as waiver and disgorgement, contract cure, and communication 
between FCPA enforcement authorities and ICSID tribunals to 
remedy the problems identified herein. 
I.  OVERLAPPING LEGAL REGIMES 
The system of international investment arbitration is designed to 
resolve disputes between investors and host states, whereas domestic 
anticorruption laws such as the FCPA are designed to punish 
investors for their illicit conduct. When corruption occurs in the 
context of foreign direct investment, these two legal regimes 
frequently overlap. This Part provides an overview of each regime. 
A. ICSID Arbitration 
Investment arbitration allows private corporations investing in a 
country to sue that host state directly before an international tribunal, 
thus bypassing that country’s domestic legal system.21 ICSID, 
established by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States22 (the ICSID 
Convention) in 1965 as an arm of the World Bank, is a leading 
arbitral body that provides a framework for resolving investment 
disputes.23 ICSID’s principal goal is to “promot[e] international 
capital investment by allaying the common apprehension that 
investors seeking opportunities in the developing world lack[] 
effective legal protections against a foreign state.”24 ICSID has largely 
succeeded in allaying such concerns by providing a neutral forum for 
resolving investor-state disputes.25 ICSID does not directly arbitrate 
disputes, but rather “provides the institutional and procedural 
framework” for independent tribunals constituted under its rules to 
 
 21. See Background Information on the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID), INT’L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT INVESTMENT DISPS. 1 (Jan. 20, 2013), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=Show
Document&icsidOverview=true&language=English (“Investor-State [arbitration] is a form of 
resolution of disputes between foreign investors and the State that hosts their investment [and 
that] allows foreign investors to initiate dispute settlement proceedings against a host State.”). 
 22. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 160. 
 23. Torres-Fowler, supra note 1, at 996. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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do so.26 Tribunals are typically composed of three arbitrators: one 
selected by each party and the third appointed by agreement of the 
parties or by the two other arbitrators.27 Their decisions are not 
binding on future tribunals,28 but the rationales they employ may be 
persuasive.29 Notably, ICSID awards are not subject to appeal.30 
Though commercial arbitration proceedings are typically kept 
strictly confidential,31 ICSID has moved away from a model of strict 
confidentiality so as to develop a body of case law that may be 
persuasive to future tribunals.32 Pursuant to Article 48 of the ICSID 
 
 26. ICSID Dispute Settlement Facilities, INT’L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT INVESTMENT 
DISPS., https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=Rig
htFrame&FromPage=Dispute%20Settlement%20Facilities&pageName=Disp_settl_facilities 
(last visited Jan. 3, 2014). 
 27. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States, supra note 22, art. 37(2)(b), 17 U.S.T. at 1285, 575 U.N.T.S. at 184. 
 28. Jeffery P. Commission, Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Citation Analysis 
of a Developing Jurisprudence, 24 J. INT’L ARB. 129, 131 (2007) (“[T]here exists no obligation 
of stare decisis in the context of investment treaty arbitration . . . .”). 
 29. See id. at 129 (“[T]he awards and decisions reported in ICSID Reports, and elsewhere, 
are not binding on any future tribunals, but remain persuasive nonetheless.”). See generally Tai-
Heng Cheng, Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
1014, 1021–44 (2006) (describing, in form and practice, the concept of precedent in investment 
arbitration). 
 30. See Tai-Heng Cheng, The Role of Justice in Annulling Investor-State Arbitration 
Awards, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 236, 251 (2013) (“Unlike a domestic court decision, which is 
subject to appeal by a higher court, an ICSID award is not open to appeal. It is only subject to 
rectification, interpretation, revision or annulment, which are all different in nature 
from appeals.”); see also Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States 
and Nationals of Other States, supra note 22, arts. 50–52, 17 U.S.T. at 1289–90, 575 U.N.T.S. at 
190–91 (providing limited redress for disputes relating to the meaning or scope of award, newly 
discovered material facts, or procedural errors); id. art. 53(1), 17 U.S.T. at 1291, 575 U.N.T.S. at 
194 (noting that awards are binding on parties). 
 31. See Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 427, 447 (2010) (“[T]he precise number of cases and the specific nature of their decisions 
are difficult to determine because of the number of potential arbitral forums open to investor-
state disputes and the varying degrees of confidentiality with which the forums cloak their 
operations.”); id. at 462 (“[T]he confidentiality which in varying degrees applies to investor-
state dispute settlement . . . appears to be derived from the processes and culture of 
international commercial arbitration.”). 
 32. Andrew de Lotbinière Mcdougall & Ank Santens, ICSID Amends Its Arbitration Rules, 
WHITE & CASE 2 (Oct. 2006), http://www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/e6da84a5-e1a8-462a-
89e3-147a369efdb8/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/232b4eb2-3248-48f9-aca5-16652b545fd
8/article_Icsid_Amends_its_Arbitration_Rules.pdf; see CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LAURENCE 
SHORE & MATHEW WEINIGER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE 
PRINCIPLES ¶ 1.34 (2007) (“In contrast to commercial arbitration, where the reporting of 
awards is often restricted or fragmentary, the practice in investment arbitration . . . has come to 
be that the majority of awards are made public.”).  
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Convention, both parties to an arbitration proceeding must consent 
for an award to be published.33 Nevertheless, following amendments 
to the ICSID Convention and Rules in 2006, tribunals must now 
publish the legal reasoning behind their awards, subject to the Article 
48 requirement of consent for publication of the full award.34 This 
eschewal of strict confidentiality has allowed for the development of a 
body of case law regarding the effect of corruption on the validity of 
investment contracts. 
To invoke ICSID jurisdiction, a claimant must satisfy three 
prerequisites set forth in Article 25 of the ICSID Convention.35 First, 
the dispute must be between a state party to the ICSID Convention 
and a national (usually a corporation or other business entity) of 
another ICSID contracting state.36 Second, the dispute must arise 
directly out of an investment.37 Third, the parties must have consented 
in writing to ICSID arbitration.38 
Consent to ICSID arbitration is typically established in a BIT or 
in a multilateral treaty such as the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) or the Energy Charter Treaty.39 The majority 
of ICSID claims are commenced pursuant to BITs,40 which govern the 
 
 33. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States, supra note 22, art. 48(5), 17 U.S.T. at 1288, 575 U.N.T.S. at 188. 
 34. Rule 48(4) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules reads: “The Centre shall not publish the 
award without the consent of the parties. The Centre shall, however, promptly include in its 
publications excerpts of the legal reasoning of the Tribunal.” INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF 
INV. DISPUTES, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules), in ICSID 
CONVENTION, REGULATIONS AND RULES, at 122, Rule 48(4), ICSID/15 (Apr. 2006). Before 
2006, Rule 48 provided only that “[t]he Centre may . . . include in its publications excerpts of the 
legal rules applied by the Tribunal.” Lotbinière & Santens, supra note 32, at 2 (emphasis 
omitted). In 2010, ICSID embarked on a project to obtain consent for publication from all 
parties to concluded cases to expand the public accessibility of ICSID jurisprudence. Publication 
of ICSID Decisions and Awards with the Parties’ Consent, INT’L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT 
INVESTMENT DISPS., https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH
&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=Announcements&pag
eName=Announcement54 (last visited Jan. 3, 2014). 
 35. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States, supra note 22, at art. 25(1), 17 U.S.T. at 1280, 575 U.N.T.S. at 175. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 25–26 
(2007). 
 40. Background Information on the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID), supra note 21, at 2. 
LOSCO IN PP CLEAN (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/26/2014  7:24 PM 
1208 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1201 
 
investment relationships between a state party and investors from the 
other state party.41 As bilateral agreements, these can be individually 
tailored to particular circumstances; therefore, their provisions may 
vary in wording and scope.42 Nevertheless, almost all BITs contain the 
same types of provisions.43 In general, BITs confer rights and 
privileges upon the investor while imposing obligations on the host 
state—that is, the country receiving the investment.44 Such obligations 
normally include a responsibility to refrain from unlawful 
expropriation of the investment,45 as well as guarantees of fair and 
equitable treatment;46 full protection and security;47 prompt, adequate, 
and effective compensation;48 national treatment;49 and most-favored-
nation treatment.50 Furthermore, most BITs define the term 
“investment” and extend protection only to claims that satisfy that 
definition.51 Finally, nearly all BITs grant investors the right to have 
investment disputes resolved in binding international arbitration 
 
 41. See ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT 
TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 41–49 (2009) (tracing the origin and development of 
BITs and noting that “[u]ntil 1968, BITs only provided for state-to-state dispute 
resolution . . . [and] that [apparently] the first BIT that expressly incorporates provisions for 
investor-state arbitration . . . is Indonesia-Netherlands (1968)”).  
 42. See ANDREAS KULICK, GLOBAL PUBLIC INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW 18 (James Crawford & John S. Bell eds., 2012) (noting “considerable differences in 
wording and scope of protection” among BITs). 
 43.  See id. (“[T]he major issues addressed in different BITs are strikingly similar: almost 
all contain a definition of investors and investment, a number of investor rights – admission, fair 
and equitable treatment, full protection and security, prompt adequate and effective 
compensation, national treatment, most favored nation treatment – and the general consent to 
binding investment arbitration, i.e. ICSID or otherwise.”). 
 44. See KULICK, supra note 42, at 1 (“BITs mainly, and in a plethora of cases exclusively, 
deal with investor rights.”); NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 41, at 64 (“[International 
Investment Agreements] impose obligations on host states with respect to investments and 
investors; there are no corresponding international obligations imposed on foreign 
investors . . . or on the investors’ home  state . . . .”); VAN HARTEN, supra note 39, at 40–41 
(“[T]he capital-importing state assumes major liabilities to multinational firms without securing 
any legal advantage under the treaty for its own nationals. . . . [T]he effect is to regulate capital-
importing states intensively without imposing binding obligations on home states or investors.”). 
 45. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 41, at 334–35. 
 46. Id. at 233–35. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. at 18. 
 49. Id. at 146–50. 
 50. Id. at 192, 200–01. 
 51. See KULICK, supra note 42, at 18 (noting that a BIT’s scope of protection is tied to its 
definition of “investment”). 
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without having to first exhaust the remedies available in the domestic 
legal system of the host state.52 By providing general consent to 
dispute resolution under ICSID rules, BITs thus satisfy the consent 
requirement for ICSID jurisdiction.53 
The number of BITs in force has exploded over the past 
decade,54 with more than 2,500 such treaties now concluded.55 As the 
number of BITs has increased, so has the number of claims brought in 
ICSID arbitration. “From 1996 to 2005 ICSID registered 166 claims, 
compared to 35 claims in the previous three decades . . . .”56 This 
number continues to grow rapidly, with thirty-nine new claims 
brought in 2012 alone, a 20 percent increase from the previous year.57 
B. The FCPA and Anticorruption Enforcement 
The past decade has also seen a significant increase in the 
enforcement of anticorruption statutes such as the FCPA. When it 
was enacted in 1977,58 the FCPA was the world’s first anticorruption 
statute.59 Though enforcement was limited for the first two decades of 
 
 52. See Carlos G. Garcia, All the Other Dirty Little Secrets: Investment Treaties, Latin 
America, and the Necessary Evil of Investor-State Arbitration, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 301, 313 (2004) 
(“Historically, an alien investor was required to exhaust local remedies before its state could 
espouse a claim before an international tribunal. . . . Under BITs, these rules have either been 
eliminated or modified.”). 
 53. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States, supra note 22, art. 25(1), 17 U.S.T. at 1280, 575 U.N.T.S. at 175; see VAN HARTEN, 
supra note 39, at 100 (describing general consent in investment treaties as “a blank cheque” for 
future arbitration).  
 54. VAN HARTEN, supra note 39, at 3. 
 55. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 41, at 57. 
 56. VAN HARTEN, supra note 39, at 30. 
 57. INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, ANNUAL REPORT 2012, at 24–25 
(2012),  available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSID
PublicationsRH&actionVal=ViewAnnualReports&year=2012_Eng.  
 58. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o, 78dd-1 to -3 (2012)).  
 59. See Tor Krever, Curbing Corruption? The Efficacy of the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, 33 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 83, 87 (2007) (“The FCPA was passed by the U.S. 
Congress in December 1977 . . . . [It] was the first [legislation] in the world to recognize and seek 
to curb the contribution of foreign firms.”); Lauren Ann Ross, Note, Using Foreign Relations 
Law To Limit Extraterritorial Application of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 62 DUKE L.J. 
445, 451–52 (2012) (“Instances of overseas commercial bribery surfaced in the wake of the 
Watergate scandal, spurring Congress to enact the world’s first anticorruption statute, the 
FCPA, in 1977.”). 
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the statute’s life,60 enforcement has since increased dramatically—
particularly in the last ten years. From 2004 to 2009 alone, the number 
of new enforcement actions increased from as few as five to over 
forty.61 Criminal penalties in excess of $20 million are now 
commonplace, and the largest settlements have exceeded $100 
million.62 Siemens’s 2008 settlement totaling $800 million is currently 
the largest on record.63 
The FCPA is composed of two parts: the antibribery provisions64 
and the accounting provisions.65 The antibribery portion of the statute 
prohibits corporations, including their agents and employees, from 
making payments or giving gifts to foreign officials.66 Specifically, it 
criminalizes “the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to 
give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to” a foreign 
official.67 In so doing, the FCPA takes a supply-side approach to 
punishing and preventing corruption—that is, it seeks to reduce the 
supply of bribes to foreign officials by punishing bribe-paying 
corporations—rather than attempting to reduce the demand for 
bribes by punishing bribe-taking officials.68 It applies not only to 
domestic businesses,69 but also to foreign and domestic issuers of 
securities listed on U.S. stock exchanges who commit violations 
outside the United States70 and to foreign companies who commit acts 
in furtherance of a violation “while in the territory of the United 
 
 60. See Krever, supra note 59, at 93 (“In its first two decades, enforcement of the Act by 
the DOJ and SEC was, at best, sporadic, and limited to high profile investigations.”). 
 61. Ross, supra note 59, at 460; Richard L. Cassin, 2009 FCPA Enforcement Index, FCPA 
BLOG (Dec. 31, 2009, 3:15 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2009/12/31/2009-fcpa-
enforcement-index.html. 
 62. Ross, supra note 59, at 460; Cassin, supra note 14. 
 63. Cassin, supra note 14. Interestingly, nine of the ten biggest penalties were levied against 
non-U.S. companies. Id. 
 64. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2012). 
 65. Id. § 78m(b). 
 66. Id. §§ 78dd-1 to -3. 
 67. Id. §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -3(a). 
 68. See David C. Weiss, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC Disgorgement of 
Profits, and the Evolving International Bribery Regime: Weighing Proportionality, Retribution, 
and Deterrence, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 471, 476–77 (2009) (noting that the FCPA’s focus on 
supply-side actors of foreign bribery constituted the first effort in the world to criminalize large, 
multinational corporations for paying foreign officials). 
 69. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2. 
 70. Id. § 78dd-1; Ross, supra note 59, at 454. 
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States.”71 The extraterritorial reach of the statute gives enforcing 
authorities broad discretion, and uncertainty about the meaning of 
the statutory phrase “in the territory of the United States” may add to 
that discretion.72  
Among signatories to the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development’s Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
(OECD Convention),73 the United States leads the way in 
prosecutions for foreign bribery.74 But the FCPA is not the world’s 
most stringent antibribery statute. The United Kingdom, for example, 
enacted a new antibribery regime in 2010, which entered into force in 
July 2011.75 That statute is “substantially broader and stricter than the 
FCPA.”76 Whereas the FCPA criminalizes only the payment of bribes 
to foreign officials,77 the Bribery Act 2010 (U.K. Bribery Act) 
criminalizes the payment of bribes to foreign public officials,78 as well 
 
 71. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a). 
 72. See Ross, supra note 59, at 464–65 (“Within the confines of the statute, it is not clear 
what it means to be ‘in the territory of the United States’ . . . .”). The FCPA’s reach may even 
extend to such attenuated contacts as the transfer of money unintentionally through a U.S. bank 
account. Id. However, especially in the wake of Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 130 S. Ct. 
2869, 2877–78 (2010), there is a strong presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. 
laws (including the FCPA), particularly when the intended effects of the illegal activity are felt 
outside the United States. Id. at 2877–83; Ross, supra note 59, at 472–73. 
 73. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 
1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998). 
 74. See FRITZ HEIMANN AND GILLIAN DELL, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, EXPORTING 
CORRUPTION? COUNTRY ENFORCEMENT OF THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION 
PROGRESS REPORT 2012, at 6 (2012), available at http://files.transparency.org/
content/download/510/2109/file/2012_ExportingCorruption_OECDProgress_EN.pdf (“Another 
positive development is the substantial increase in the number of cases brought in the countries 
in the Active Enforcement category. The US leads with 275 cases, an increase of 48 since last 
year . . . .”). A 2012 report by Transparency International covering thirty-seven of the thirty-
nine signatories to the OECD Convention classified seven countries as “active” enforcers of the 
Convention’s provisions and twelve countries as “moderate” enforcers. Id. 
 75. Id. at 36–37. 
 76. Elizabeth K. Spahn, Multijurisdictional Bribery Law Enforcement: The OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 17 (2012); see Sharifa G. Hunter, A Comparative 
Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the U.K. Bribery Act, and the Practical 
Implications of Both on International Business, 18 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 89, 109 (2011) 
(comparing and contrasting the antibribery provisions of the FCPA and the U.K. Bribery Act). 
According to Professor Hunter, the actual impact of the U.K. Bribery Act will depend on the 
“prosecutory appetite” of the U.K. Serious Fraud Office. Id. 
 77. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2012); Hunter, supra note 76, at 96–97. 
 78. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 6 (U.K.); Spahn, supra note 76, at 17 n.73. 
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as to private individuals.79 Unlike the FCPA, it also criminalizes the 
receipt of bribes.80 The FCPA provides an exception for facilitation 
payments intended “to expedite or to secure the performance of a 
routine governmental action,”81 whereas the U.K. Bribery Act 
provides no such exception.82 It does, however, provide an affirmative 
defense through which a corporation may avoid liability for failure to 
prevent bribery by demonstrating that it had “adequate procedures” 
in place to prevent bribery.83 The FCPA provides no such compliance 
defense.84 
The burden of FCPA enforcement is jointly carried by the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC).85 The DOJ investigates and prosecutes criminal 
charges, and the SEC brings civil suits against violators.86 Historically, 
the SEC focused primarily on violations of the accounting provisions, 
but it is now becoming more active in enforcing the bribery 
provisions.87 Today, the two agencies “work together to bring parallel 
criminal and civil [actions] against [violators].”88 The Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) has also recently begun to play a significant 
role in investigating FCPA violations.89 
 
 79. Bribery Act § 1; Hunter, supra note 76, at 97–98; Spahn, supra note 76, at 17 n.73. 
 80. Bribery Act § 2; Hunter, supra note 76, at 95–96; Spahn, supra note 76, at 17 n.73. 
 81. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b); see Hunter, supra note 76, at 99 (“Routine governmental action 
refers to general bureaucratic tasks that foreign officials ordinarily perform. Notably, 
the FCPA’s definition of a facilitation payment expressly excludes any foreign official’s decision 
to award new business to, or continued business with, any particular party.” (footnote omitted)). 
 82. Hunter, supra note 76, at 100; Henry W. Asbill et al., DOJ/SEC’s Resource Guide to the 
U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Jones Day Summary and Analysis, JONES DAY (Dec. 2012), 
http://www.jonesday.com/DOJ_SEC_Resource_Guide_to_FCPA/?RSS=true. 
 83. Bribery Act § 7(2). See generally Peter Alldridge, The U.K. Bribery Act: “The 
Caffeinated Younger Sibling of the FCPA,” 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1181, 1202–10 (2012) (analyzing the 
adequate-procedures defense). 
 84. Hunter, supra note 76, at 106; Asbill et al., supra note 82. 
 85. Weiss, supra note 68, at 478. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Thomas McSorley, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 749, 779–80 
(2011); Ross, supra note 59, at 461. A 2011 FBI sting operation led to the arrest of twenty-two 
individuals for FCPA violations. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Twenty-Two Executives 
and Employees of Military and Law Enforcement Products Companies Charged in Foreign 
Bribery Scheme (Jan. 19, 2010), available at http://www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-
releases/2010/wfo011910.htm. The FBI was reportedly engaged in at least six undercover FCPA 
investigations in 2011. McSorley, supra, at 779–80. 
LOSCO IN PP CLEAN (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/26/2014  7:24 PM 
2014] STREAMLINING THE CORRUPTION DEFENSE 1213 
 
Penalties for FCPA violations may include criminal fines as well 
as disgorgement of profits.90 Disgorgement, an equitable remedy 
designed to prevent unjust enrichment,91 is relatively new to the 
FCPA context. The SEC imported the penalty into the context of 
FCPA enforcement only after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002.92 In applying the remedy as a punishment for FCPA violators, 
the SEC distinguishes between legally and illegally obtained profits.93 
Once a causal link is established between an illicit act and profits 
stemming from that act, the SEC can require the violator to forfeit, 
with interest, the approximate amount earned from the unlawful 
activity unless the company can show a break in the causal chain.94 
Given the potential harshness of such a penalty, the FCPA 
authorizes the U.S. Attorney General to issue informal advisory 
opinions to corporations that inquire about the implications of 
potential violations.95 An approving advisory opinion creates a 
rebuttable presumption that a corporation’s actions do not violate the 
FCPA.96 Advisory opinions can be disseminated to the public, but 
they are not binding and do not create precedent.97 In November 
2012, the DOJ and SEC jointly released a 120-page guide outlining 
the agencies’ “approach and priorities” to enforcing the FCPA.98 
The DOJ’s enforcement of the FCPA relies primarily on out-of-
court settlement agreements called non-prosecution agreements 
(NPAs) and deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs).99 As 
enforcement has expanded, so has the DOJ’s use of these 
 
 90. Weiss, supra note 68, at 478. 
 91. Marc Alain Bohn, What Exactly Is Disgorgement?, FCPA BLOG (Mar. 17, 2011, 7:10 
AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/3/17/what-exactly-is-disgorgement.html. 
 92. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.); Weiss, supra note 68, at 474. 
 93. Bohn, supra note 91. Illegally obtained profits are those obtained through a violation of 
the FCPA. 
 94. Id. 
 95. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(e), -2(f) (2012); Allen R. Brooks, Note, A Corporate Catch-22: 
How Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements Impede the Full Development of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 137, 147 (2010). 
 96. Brooks, supra note 95, at 147. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Lanny A. Breuer & Robert S. Khuzami, Foreword to CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE & ENFORCEMENT DIV., U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE 
U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2012), available at www.justice.gov/
criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf. 
 99. Brooks, supra note 95, at 156. 
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agreements,100 which are intended to resolve criminal cases without a 
trial.101 Though they may benefit corporations in the short term,102 out-
of-court settlements do not create precedent and therefore offer little 
guidance for corporations.103 As a result, some commentators have 
criticized prosecution agreements for hindering the development of a 
body of law relating to FCPA prosecution.104 
NPAs are similar to DPAs in most respects. The two types of 
agreements typically contain a number of standard requirements, 
such as cooperation,105 admission of conduct,106 monetary penalties,107 
business reforms,108 independent monitors,109 and miscellaneous 
 
 100. Id. at 138. From 1993 to 2002, the DOJ entered into sixteen prosecution agreements. Id. 
at 149. Since 2002, that number has increased dramatically, peaking in 2007 and again in 2010 
with thirty-nine agreements filed in each of those years. Joseph Warin, 2013 Mid-Year Update 
on Corporate Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 24, 2013, 9:20 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/
corpgov/2013/07/24/2013-mid-year-update-on-corporate-deferred-prosecution-and-non-
prosecution-agreements. Thirty-seven agreements were filed in 2012. Id. 
 101. Brooks, supra note 95, at 139. 
 102. Id. at 157–58. 
 103. Id. at 155–56. The DOJ initially set forth guidelines regarding its approach to DPAs in 
1997 in the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual. Id. at 148. The DOJ’s use of NPAs and DPAs in FCPA 
enforcement has since been guided by a series of four memoranda promulgated between 1999 
and 2008 by then–Deputy Attorneys General Eric Holder, Larry Thompson, Paul McNulty, and 
Mark Filip. See id. at 147–53 (explaining the history and modern use of NPAs and DPAs). 
 104. See, e.g., id. at 155–56 (“The DOJ’s use of DPAs and NPAs directly affects the 
development of case law under the FCPA because relevant precedent cannot develop from 
settling disputes outside the courtroom. . . . This enforcement policy increases market costs and 
inefficiencies.”). 
 105. Erik Paulsen, Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate Prosecution 
Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1434, 1439–40 (2007). “Before the Filip Memo, prosecutors 
often pressured the defendant corporation to turn over documents and data, make witnesses 
available, and waive its attorney-client privilege in order to obtain a DPA or an NPA.” Brooks, 
supra note 95, at 153–54. The agreements may also include waivers of any relevant statutes of 
limitations, meaning that the charges may remain open for a long period of time. Id. at 154. 
 106. Paulsen, supra note 105, at 1440–41. Detailed admissions to criminal charges usually 
result in the award of heavy penalties in civil suits. Id. at 1441. “The fact that corporations 
typically agree to these admissions—despite the consequences in civil suits—underscores the 
degree to which corporations desire to avoid criminal indictment and/or conviction.” Id.  
 107. Id. at 1441–42. These often include criminal penalties, civil penalties—such as 
disgorgement—and civil settlements to third parties. Id. at 1441. 
 108. Id. at 1442. These may include personnel changes and hiring of new management and 
board members. Id. They may also include changes and improvements to compliance programs, 
such as “amended financial controls, hotlines for whistleblowers, training programs to 
underscore legal behavior, new personnel hiring policies, and ethics officers.” Id. 
 109. Id. at 1443. 
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penalties.110 There is one important difference, however. In the NPA 
context, prosecutors forgo the filing of charging instruments, subject 
to the corporation’s fulfillment of the terms of the agreement, 
whereas, in the DPA context, prosecutors file an indictment and 
agree to dismiss the charges after the terms of the DPA are 
satisfied.111 This difference is significant partly because in some cases 
an indictment alone can trigger penalties for corporations.112 It also 
means that an NPA may send a less harsh message than does a DPA, 
though the conditions attached to them can be equally severe. 
Regardless, prosecution agreements appear to be firmly entrenched 
as a primary mechanism for FCPA enforcement. As such, any 
proposal for change in the application of the FCPA must incorporate 
them. 
II.  THE CORRUPTION DEFENSE 
Had the Argentine government been aware of Siemens’s corrupt 
conduct, it might have invoked that conduct as an absolute bar to its 
own liability.  The corruption defense allows host states to invoke 
corruption in the formation of a contract as a reason to consider the 
contract void, thereby precluding any claims by the investor that may 
arise from the contract.113 It is an affirmative defense resembling the 
common-law defense of unclean hands, which bars a claimant from 
recovery if he is guilty of some injustice concerning the very matter 
for which he seeks relief.114 The issue at the heart of the defense is 
whether a tribunal should enforce an investment contract that has 
been tainted by corruption. 
The roots of the corruption defense lie in a 1963 award issued by 
Judge Gunnar Lagergren in an International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC) arbitration.115 Judge Lagergren’s award in ICC Case No. 1110116 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 1438. 
 112. Weiss, supra note 68, at 512. 
 113. See Torres-Fowler, supra note 1, at 999 (“[T]he ‘corruption defense’ . . . allows tribunals 
to void an underlying contract if procured through an act of corruption or bribery.”). 
 114. Yackee, supra note 20, at 729. 
 115. Id. at 727–29; see Torres-Fowler, supra note 1, at 1010 (“ICC Case No. 1110 (1963) 
marks the first reported international arbitral award specifically addressing claims 
of corruption.”). 
 116. Case No. 1110 of 1963, 21 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 47 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.). The original text of 
Judge Lagergren’s award is reprinted in J. Gillis Wetter, Issues of Corruption Before 
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was the first reported international arbitral award to directly address 
the issue of corruption.117 There, a “politically connected Argentine 
engineer”118 sued the respondent, a British company, for breach of a 
contract to sell electrical equipment for power plants to the Peronista 
government of Argentina.119 Eight years after the initial agreement, 
the claimant had been unable “to make any sales whatsoever,”120 and 
so the respondent retained another agent for a fee of £1 million.121 
The next year, the claimant surprisingly sold approximately £27 
million worth of equipment to the new Argentine government, but 
the respondent corporation was unwilling to pay his commission, 
instead paying his replacement nearly £1 million.122 
The parties to the arbitration freely admitted that the contract 
was meant to take advantage of the claimant’s influence, yet they 
agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration nonetheless.123 In fact, 
the respondent company conceded that its only reason for retaining 
the claimant was “the quite remarkable degree of influence which he 
had with the political appointees of the Peronista Government.”124 It 
became evident, however, that the contract actually envisioned the 
 
International Arbitral Tribunals: The Authentic Text and True Meaning of Judge Gunnar 
Lagergren’s 1963 Award in ICC Case No. 1110, 10 ARB. INT’L 277 (1994). 
 117. See Wetter, supra note 116. 
 118. Torres-Fowler, supra note 1, at 1010. 
 119. Wetter, supra note 116, at 285. The names of both parties were redacted from the 
award. See id. at 282 (replacing the claimant’s and the respondent’s names with “X” and “Y,” 
respectively). For several years following the 1950 agreement the claimant failed to make any 
sales. Torres-Fowler, supra note 1, at 1011. In 1955, just months before the coup that ousted the 
Peronista government, the claimant fled Argentina for Germany, where he remained until July 
1958, several months after a new round of elections. Wetter, supra note 116, at 285; see Morris 
A. Horowitz, The Legacy of Juan Peron, CHALLENGE, Oct. 1963, at 27, 27, 29. He claimed to 
have left for Germany because of “serious medical reasons, remaining immobilized there until 
July 1958.” Wetter, supra note 116, at 285. 
 120. Torres-Fowler, supra note 1, at 1011. 
 121. Wetter, supra note 116, at 289. 
 122. Id. at 285, 289. 
 123. See Torres-Fowler, supra note 1, at 1010 (“[N]either party actually argued the agency 
contract was necessarily illicit or corrupt.”). Here, the contract giving rise to the dispute had a 
corrupt activity as its direct object: the bribing of public officials. Id. This type of contract is 
commonly known as an “intermediary agreement.” The claimant was an intermediary being 
paid to bribe officials to obtain a public contract for the respondent corporation. Many 
investment disputes deal with another type of corruption, which occurs not as the object of the 
contract but in its procurement. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 124. Wetter, supra note 116, at 288. 
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payment of bribes to government officials.125 The parties asked Judge 
Lagergren to disregard the corrupt object of the contract and to 
render an award nonetheless. 
Judge Lagergren refused to do so.126 Despite the parties’ 
agreement to disregard corruption, as well as evidence that 
corruption was unavoidable in Argentina, he raised the issue of 
jurisdiction sua sponte. He declined to exercise jurisdiction over the 
dispute, reasoning that international public policy and bonos mores 
rendered the contract “invalid or at least unenforceable.”127 Bribery, 
he declared, 
is an international evil; it is contrary to good morals and to an 
international public policy common to the community of nations. . . . 
Parties who ally themselves in an enterprise of the present nature 
must realise that they have forfeited any right to ask for assistance of 
the machinery of justice . . . in settling their disputes.128 
The lasting impact of Judge Lagergren’s opinion is that it looked 
beyond national laws, enunciating “a general principle of law”129 that 
corrupt contracts are void or unenforceable as contrary to 
international public policy.130 The notion that bribery is contrary to 
international public policy has since developed into an important part 
of arbitral jurisprudence in the context of international investment.131 
In recent years, ICSID tribunals have built upon the framework 
established by Judge Lagergren.132 Confronting similar questions, 
 
 125. The claimant was to receive a commission of 10 percent of all sales. Id. at 285. Of that 
commission, “2 per cent [was] for [the claimant] and 8 per cent [was] for ‘Peron and his boys.’” 
Id. at 290. 
 126. Case No. 1110 of 1963, 21 Y.B. Comm. Arb. at 52, ¶ 23. 
 127. See id. at 51, ¶ 16 (“[I]t cannot be contested that there exists a general principle of law 
recognised by civilised nations that contracts which seriously violate bonos mores or 
international public policy are invalid or at least unenforceable and that they cannot be 
sanctioned by courts or arbitrators.”).  
 128. Id. at 52, ¶¶ 20, 23. 
 129. Id. at 51, ¶ 16.  
 130. Id. at 52, ¶ 23; Wetter, supra note 117, at 278. 
 131. See, e.g., World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, 
Award, ¶ 157 (Oct. 4, 2006), 46 I.L.M. 339 (2007) (“[T]his Tribunal is convinced that bribery is 
contrary to the international public policy of most, if not all, States or, to use another formula, 
to transnational public policy . . . .”). 
 132. See Yackee, supra note 20, at 727–34 (discussing the origins of the corruption defense 
and its current status). 
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several tribunals have affirmed his premise that corrupt contracts are 
void as contrary to international public policy.133 
Four questions are relevant to understanding the features of the 
developing defense. First, what is the nature of the wrongful conduct? 
Second, what law is applied by the tribunal? Third, what evidentiary 
burden is borne by the parties? And fourth, what is the appropriate 
remedy?134 These inquiries are relevant not only to the calculus of 
host states seeking to assert the defense. Because some conduct that 
may give rise to a successful corruption defense may also give rise to 
an FCPA investigation, they are also relevant to crafting just 
solutions to the problems created by FCPA-ICSID overlap. 
A. Nature of the Wrongful Conduct 
The first inquiry regards the nature of the wrongful conduct. 
Several distinctions may be made between different types of corrupt 
conduct. First, corruption may be either unilateral or mutual. Second, 
corruption may be “hard” or “soft.” Third, corruption may be found 
either in the object of a contract or in its procurement. 
1. Unilateral or Multilateral.  Unilateral corruption involves 
misconduct on the part of only one party.135 More often than not, this 
has meant fraud on the part of the investor.136 Multiple tribunals have 
allowed the respondent–host state to assert the corruption defense in 
response to unilateral corruption.137 In contrast, mutual corruption 
occurs when both parties are complicit in the misconduct. Bribery is a 
 
 133. Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L. v. Republic of El Sal., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award, 
¶ 252 (Aug. 2, 2006), http://italaw.com/documents/Inceysa_Vallisoletana_en_001.pdf; World 
Duty Free, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, ¶ 157. 
 134. This formulation of the defense’s contours is based on this author’s synthesis of the 
existing case law and scholarship. 
 135. KULICK, supra note 42, at 328. 
 136. See, e.g., Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide v. Republic of the Phil., 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Award, ¶ 5 (Aug. 16, 2007), http://italaw.com/
documents/FraportAward.pdf; Inceysa Vallisoletana,  ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award, ¶ 3; 
see also KULICK, supra note 42, at 328 (observing that two of three cases involving unilateral 
corruption scrutinized conduct by the investor). 
 137. See, e.g., Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, 
Award, ¶ 345; Inceysa Vallisoletana,  ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award, ¶ 154.  
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prime example because it entails one party making an illicit payment 
(“active” bribery) and the other accepting it (“passive” bribery).138   
Whereas unilateral corruption has given rise to a successful 
corruption defense on more than one occasion, only once has mutual 
corruption been invoked as grounds for a successful corruption 
defense.139 In World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya,140 the 
respondent–host state succeeded in asserting the corruption defense 
after the claimant made a cash payment of $2 million to the Kenyan 
president’s reelection fund.141 Whether a state can assert the defense 
for mutual corruption may depend on whether the conduct of the 
state official can be attributed to the state itself. Notably, the World 
Duty Free tribunal did not impute the president’s actions to the 
state;142 however, it is unclear whether future tribunals will invoke 
misconduct by government officials as grounds for rejecting the 
defense. If a tribunal did attribute an official’s conduct to the state, it 
could conceivably invoke either the common-law rule of estoppel or 
the doctrine of contributory fault to prevent the state from asserting 
the defense.143 
Some commentators have called for tribunals to apply a rule of 
comparative fault, under which a state could invoke the corruption 
defense, but only to the extent that it is free of guilt.144 The state 
would still be responsible for compensating the investor for a 
percentage of its claim corresponding to the percentage of fault 
attributable to the state.145 For example, a state in which high-level 
 
 138. See KULICK, supra note 42, at 328 (discussing unilateral and multilateral conduct as 
they relate to each party’s role in the corruption). 
 139. World Duty Free, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, ¶ 157. As this Note was going to 
print, an ICSID tribunal in the matter of Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/10/3, Award (Oct. 4, 2013), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw3012.pdf, rendered an award barring an Israeli company’s claims as a result of 
bribery. Id. ¶ 389. The tribunal found that the claimant made corrupt payments to an Uzbek 
official and to the brother of Uzbekistan’s prime minister. Id. ¶¶ 325, 351. The tribunal 
ultimately concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the claims because the claimant’s 
investment was not made in accordance with Uzbek law as required by Article 1(1) of the 
Israel-Uzbekistan BIT. Id. ¶¶ 372–74, 389. 
 140. World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award (Oct. 4, 
2006), 46 I.L.M. 339 (2007). 
 141. Id. ¶¶ 66, 157. 
 142. Id. ¶ 185. 
 143. KULICK, supra note 42, at 322–25. 
 144. Torres-Fowler, supra note 1, at 1029–30. 
 145. Id. 
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officials regularly extort bribes might be responsible for 75 percent of 
the investor’s claim, whereas an investor who seeks out and bribes a 
low-level official might only be able to recover 25 percent of its claim. 
Nevertheless, considering the paucity of case law and the fact that 
World Duty Free is not binding on future tribunals, it is unclear what 
effect misconduct by government officials will have on a state’s ability 
to assert the defense. 
2. Hard or Soft.  Second, corruption may be either “hard” or 
“soft.” Hard corruption is the offer or promise of an undue advantage 
to a public official to gain an improper advantage.146 It may be done 
directly or through an intermediary.147 It entails “an intentional act 
pursued with the purpose of influencing a public official in the 
performance of his or her official duties, which in turn is directed at 
gaining an undue business advantage.”148 The “soft” form of 
corruption, or “influence peddling,” is essentially an attenuated form 
of hard corruption. It entails the offer or promise of an undue 
advantage to a person who claims to be able to exert an undue 
influence on a public official.149 Influence peddling by definition 
involves an intermediary, but in contrast to hard corruption, the 
intermediary need not actually pay a bribe. Moreover, a corporation 
engaging in influence peddling need not intend to influence specific 
conduct on the part of the public official. The OECD Convention 
does not require states to criminalize influence peddling, and the 
FCPA does not explicitly do so, given that it requires a payment to be 
given in exchange for something—in other words, there must be a 
“quid pro quo.”150 Whereas a number of ICSID tribunals have upheld 
 
 146. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, supra note 73, art. 1(1), 37 I.L.M at 4; KULICK, supra note 42, at 309. 
 147. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, supra note 73, art. 1(1), 37 I.L.M at 4; KULICK, supra note 42, at 309. ICC Case 
No. 1110 involved such an intermediary agreement, with a portion of the intermediary’s 
commission to be paid to government officials. Case No. 1110 of 1963, 21 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 47, 
48 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.).  
 148. KULICK, supra note 42, at 309.  
 149. Hilmar Raeschke-Kessler & Dorothee Gottwald, Corruption in Foreign Investment—
Contracts and Dispute Settlement Between Investors, States, and Agents, 9 J. WORLD 
INVESTMENT & TRADE 5, 7 (2008). 
 150. See McSorley, supra note 89, at 762–63 (“There must be some quid pro quo element: 
the illegal payment must be understood to be given in exchange for unlawful government 
action, although completion of the desired action is not required.”). 
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the corruption defense in cases of hard corruption,151 no tribunal has 
allowed a state to invoke the defense for “mere” influence peddling, 
and history suggests that future tribunals will also hesitate do so.152 
3. Object or Procurement.  Third, corruption may be found in a 
contract’s object or in its procurement.153 Both give rise to a successful 
corruption defense. An intermediary agreement for the bribery of a 
public official is the prototypical example of a contract with a corrupt 
object. Because the consideration (bribery) offered by one party is an 
illegal act, the contract is legally unenforceable.154 Such a contract is 
equivalent to a contract for murder155—in the event of breach, a 
tribunal will not force either party to make good on its obligation to 
commit bribery. Most ICSID jurisprudence, however, deals with 
corruption in the procurement of a contract. When a corporation 
commits fraud or bribery to win a public concession, for example, 
tribunals have generally permitted states to invoke the corruption 
defense, even if the contract itself is free from defects.156 
The proposal set forth in Part III of this Note focuses on conduct 
that both violates the FCPA and may give rise to a corruption defense 
by host states—in particular, bribery that occurs in the procurement 
 
 151. E.g., Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/25, Award, ¶¶ 401–06 (Aug. 16, 2007), http://italaw.com/
documents/FraportAward.pdf; Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L. v. Republic of El Sal., ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/26, Award, ¶¶ 250–52 (Aug. 2, 2006), http://italaw.com/documents/
Inceysa_Vallisoletana_en_001.pdf; Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulg., ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/24, Award, ¶ 321 (Aug. 27, 2008), http://italaw.com/documents/
PlamaBulgariaAward.pdf; World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/00/7, Award, ¶ 157 (Oct. 4, 2006), 46 I.L.M. 339 (2007). 
 152. See Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award, 
¶¶ 111–12, 132 (Dec. 8, 2000), 41 I.L.M. 896 (2002) (refusing to allow Egypt to invoke 
corruption as a defense after the claimant made a number of suspicious payments to an 
intermediary without evidence that the intermediary used that money to bribe officials of the 
host state). 
 153. When corruption is found in the object of a contract, “the performance that the ‘buyer’ 
seeks from the ‘seller’ is itself an illegal, immoral, or otherwise disapproved act.” Yackee, supra 
note 20, at 729. When corruption is found in the procurement of a contract, “the core 
contractual object [may be] facially unobjectionable, yet the state alleges that this relationship 
was attained through the investor’s involvement in a secondary, corrupt scheme.” Id.  
 154. E.g., Case No. 1110 of 1963, 21 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 47, 52, ¶ 23 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.). 
 155. Yackee, supra note 20, at 729. 
 156. E.g., Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, 
Award, ¶¶ 401–06; Inceysa Vallisoletana, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award, ¶¶ 250–52; 
Plama Consortium Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award, ¶ 321; World Duty Free, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, ¶ 157. 
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of investment contracts. Although an understanding of the corruption 
defense would not be complete without examining how tribunals have 
treated unilateral corruption, fraud alone does not constitute a 
violation of the FCPA. Moreover, the FCPA does not forbid 
influence peddling because it does not entail the passing of bribes to 
public officials. Finally, although the FCPA does not distinguish 
between corruptly procured contracts and those with a corrupt object, 
the corruption defense is rarely asserted in response to contracts with 
a corrupt object. Therefore, corruptly procured contracts are most 
relevant to this Note’s analysis. 
B. Law Applied by the Tribunal 
When states have succeeded in asserting the corruption defense, 
the rationale of tribunals has varied. Tribunals have relied on three 
principal legal justifications for recognizing the corruption defense: 
the concept of international (or transnational) public policy, the 
requirement that an investment be made in “accordance with laws,” 
and the obligation of the parties to act in good faith. 
1. International Public Policy.  First, it is relatively well-settled in 
ICSID jurisprudence that corruption is contrary to international 
public policy. Tribunals have built upon the reasoning of Judge 
Lagergren in ICC Case No. 1110, invoking both bribery and fraud as 
grounds for voiding the underlying contract as contrary to 
international public policy.157 The international public policy of a state 
consists of three elements: “fundamental principles, pertaining to 
justice or morality, that the state wishes to protect even when it is not 
directly concerned”; lois de police, the “rules designed to serve the 
essential political, social, or economic interests of the State”; and 
international obligations owed by a state toward other states or 
international organizations.158 International public policy is not a 
supranational principle, but merely signifies “domestic public policy 
applied to foreign awards.”159 As such, its content and application may 
vary from state to state.160 
 
 157. Inceysa Vallisoletana, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award, ¶ 252; World Duty Free, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, ¶ 157. 
 158. Pierre Mayer & Audley Sheppard, Final Report on Public Policy as a Bar to 
Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, 19 ARB. INT’L 249, 255 (2003).  
 159. World Duty Free, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, ¶ 138. 
 160.  Id. 
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The tribunal in Inceysa Vallisoletana v. Republic of El Salvador161 
invoked international public policy as a subsidiary justification for 
allowing the respondent–host state to assert the corruption defense to 
escape liability for breach of an investment contract.162 There, the 
claimant submitted falsified information as part of its bid for a public 
concession in violation of Salvadoran law.163 The tribunal ultimately 
held that granting the claimant treaty protection for a contract 
procured by fraud would violate international public policy.164 
According to the tribunal, international public policy consists of the 
“fundamental principles that constitute the very essence of the 
State.”165 One such principle is the notion of respect for the law.166 To 
recognize the existence of rights arising from illegal acts would violate 
the principle of respect for the law, and therefore the tribunal would 
violate international public policy if it allowed the claim to go 
forward. 
Though it dealt with bribery as opposed to fraud, the World Duty 
Free tribunal went a step farther than the Inceysa tribunal. It held 
bribery to be “contrary to the international public policy of most, if 
not all, States” and therefore contrary to transnational public policy.167 
Transnational public policy is more restricted in scope than 
international public policy, but universal in application.168 It 
“compris[es] fundamental rules of natural law, principles of universal 
justice, jus cogens [norms of] . . . international law, and the general 
 
 161. Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L. v. Republic of El Sal., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award 
(Aug. 2, 2006), http://italaw.com/documents/Inceysa_Vallisoletana_en_001.pdf. 
 162. Id. ¶ 245. 
 163. Id. ¶ 251. 
 164. Id. ¶ 252. 
 165. Id. ¶ 245. 
 166. The tribunal noted that the inclusion of provisions in the BIT stating that investments 
must be made “in accordance with law” is a “clear manifestation” of international public policy. 
Id. ¶ 246. Such provisions are discussed in Part II.B.2. 
 167. World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, ¶ 157 
(Oct. 4, 2006), 46 I.L.M. 339 (2007). 
 168. Int’l Law Ass’n, Comm. on Int’l Commercial Arbitration, London Conference, 2000, 
Interim Report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards 6–7 
(2000), available at http://www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/E723662E-053C-415A-A4C7822
577AE6B4F. Transnational public policy reflects “an international consensus as to universal 
standards and accepted norms of conduct that must always apply . . . .” Id. at 2–3. It 
“compris[es] fundamental rules of natural law, principles of universal justice, jus cogens in 
public international law, and the general principles of morality accepted by what are referred to 
as ‘civilised nations.’” Id. at 6–7. 
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principles of morality accepted by . . . ‘civilized nations.’”169 In World 
Duty Free, a $2 million cash bribe paid to the Kenyan president to 
obtain an investment contract rendered the contract voidable at 
respondent Kenya’s option.170 The tribunal verified the existence of an 
objective norm of transnational public policy against bribery by 
making reference to international conventions, comparative law, and 
arbitral awards.171 It then reasoned that there was nothing inherently 
wrong with the contract itself, but that the fact that it was procured by 
bribery allowed the state “the opportunity to relieve [it]self from its 
burdens.”172 Kenya’s defense therefore allowed it to treat the contract 
as if it were rescinded. In administering the defense, the tribunal 
called upon the maxim restitutio in integrum, which dictated that the 
bribe could not be returned to the claimant.173 
2. Accordance with Laws.  A second justification invoked by 
ICSID tribunals for granting the corruption defense rests upon treaty 
provisions stating that investments must be made in accordance with 
laws. ICSID jurisdiction is premised upon the existence of a dispute 
arising directly out of an investment.174 Additionally, the parties to a 
dispute must consent to jurisdiction.175 Nearly all BITs, which provide 
for general consent by both states to arbitrate disputes, contain a 
definition of the term “investment.”176 This definition typically 
includes a requirement that an investment be made in accordance 
with the laws of one or both contracting states. For example, the 
provision at issue in Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services 
Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines177 defines a covered 
 
 169. Id.  
 170. World Duty Free, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, ¶¶ 130, 164, 188. 
 171. Id. ¶¶ 141–57. 
 172. Id. ¶ 164. 
 173. Id. ¶ 164, 186. 
 174. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Dispute Settlement: International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes, Module 2.5: Requirements Ratione Materiae, at 5, 
UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.4 (2003). 
 175. Id. at 1. 
 176. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 177. Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/25, Award, ¶ 281 (Aug. 16, 2007), http://italaw.com/documents/FraportAward.pdf.  
Claimant Fraport obtained annulment of the award in 2010 and subsequently filed a new claim 
before ICSID. Jarrod Hepburn, Fraport Files New Claim at ICSID over Expropriation of 
Airport Terminal Project; Annulment Committee Ruling Paved Way for New Hearing by Finding 
Breach of Investor’s Right To Be Heard, INVESTMENT ARB. REP. (Mar. 31, 2011), 
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investment as “any kind of asset accepted in accordance with the 
respective laws and regulations of either [c]ontracting [s]tate.”178 An 
investment not made in accordance with the applicable laws does not 
qualify as an “investment” for purposes of the BIT, and it therefore 
does not qualify for the protections granted by the treaty, including 
the host state’s advance consent to arbitration. Thus, tribunals have 
invoked the failure of prospective investments to comply with BIT “in 
accordance” provisions as grounds for declining jurisdiction, thereby 
precluding claimants’ chances to recover. 
At least three uncertainties arise in interpreting and applying “in 
accordance” provisions. First, with which laws and regulations must 
an investor comply, and what constitutes “in accordance”? Must a 
prospective investor conduct a full legal-compliance audit for every 
investment, ensuring that it “compl[ies] with each and every provision 
of domestic law”?179 This could become an “Achilles Heel of 
investment arbitration” if a trivial violation of any law could give rise 
to a successful defense.180 The Inceysa tribunal held that the claimant’s 
investment must comply with “generally recognized rules and 
principles of International Law”181 and “universal standards and rules 
of conduct,”182 as had been specified in the underlying investment 
contract. The tribunal concluded that these principles incorporated 
the notion of good faith.183 The Inceysa and Fraport tribunals both 
held that unilateral fraud by investors caused the investments in 
question to violate “in accordance” provisions,184 though the Fraport 
dissent suggested that a minor violation of an anticorruption law, such 
 
http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20110331_7. The award was annulled pursuant to Article 
52(1)(d) of the ICSID Convention for the tribunal’s serious departure from a fundamental rule 
of procedure by denying Fraport the right to be heard. Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. 
Worldwide v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Decision on the Application 
for Annulment, ¶¶ 218–47 (Dec. 23, 2010), http://italaw.com/documents/Fraport-Annulment-
Decision.pdf. Nevertheless, the award’s annulment does not alter the significance of the 
tribunal’s reasoning with regard to the corruption defense.  
 178. Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Award, 
¶ 281 (emphasis omitted). 
 179. Id. ¶ 304. 
 180. Id. § 37 (Cremades, Arb., dissenting).  
 181. Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L. v. Republic of El Sal., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award, 
¶ 224 (Aug. 2, 2006), http://italaw.com/documents/Inceysa_Vallisoletana_en_001.pdf. 
 182. Id. ¶ 227. 
 183. Id. ¶ 230. 
 184. Inceysa Vallisoletana, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award, ¶ 239; Fraport AG 
Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Award, ¶ 401. 
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as a grease payment intended to speed up a routine transaction, might 
not run afoul of those same provisions.185 Likewise, the Inceysa 
tribunal suggested that to bar a claim, an investment must be “made 
in significant contravention” of the applicable law, “such as through 
gross misrepresentation or fraud in a government tender process.”186 
A second uncertainty lies in determining whether “in 
accordance” provisions impose a continuous duty upon the investor 
to monitor the compliance of an investment, or whether such 
provisions extend only to the initiation of the investment. The Fraport 
tribunal suggested that “in accordance” provisions apply only to the 
initiation of an investment, and that subsequent violations of the host 
state’s law “might be a defense to claimed substantive violations of 
the BIT, but could not deprive a tribunal acting under the authority 
of the BIT of its jurisdiction.”187 
A final uncertainty concerns the existence of mitigating factors 
that might excuse violations of the applicable law. The Fraport 
tribunal hypothesized that an investor who breaks the law might still 
be allowed to bring a claim if one of several factors is present.188 Such 
factors include a good-faith mistake by the investor regarding an 
unclear host-state law, reliance on incorrect legal advice, or a 
violation “not central to the profitability of the investment, such that 
the investor might have made the investment in ways that accorded 
with local law without any loss of projected profitability.”189 
Moreover, an investor could potentially assert an affirmative defense 
of estoppel to block the corruption defense if the host state endorsed 
the investment while “knowingly overlook[ing]” conduct not in 
accordance with its laws.190 No tribunal has yet invoked estoppel or 
any of the above mitigating factors in response to the corruption 
defense, so for now they remain mere hypotheticals. 
 
 185. Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Award, 
§ 37 (Cremades, Arb., dissenting).  
 186. Inceysa Vallisoletana, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award, ¶ 202 (emphasis added). 
 187. Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Award, 
¶ 345. 
 188. See id. ¶ 396 (listing several arguments in favor of a liberal policy of granting 
jurisdiction to investors’ claims). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. ¶ 346. The tribunal in World Duty Free was unwilling to impute knowledge or 
responsibility to the respondent state based on the actions of its president. The tribunal 
considered and rejected the claimant’s estoppel claim. Id. ¶ 183. If future tribunals follow this 
trend, estoppel may prove near impossible to assert. Yackee, supra note 20, at 741–42. 
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3. Good Faith.  Third, ICSID tribunals have imputed a duty of 
good faith to the parties and granted the corruption defense as a 
result of the claimant’s violation of that duty. Two ICSID tribunals 
have held fraud by an investor to constitute a violation of the duty of 
good faith. These cases indicate that the duty includes an obligation 
to provide information to the host state, at least in the initiation of an 
investment. Furthermore, applicable domestic and international law 
may incorporate the duty, meaning that a breach of good faith can 
also constitute a violation of “in accordance” provisions. 
The Inceysa tribunal held that the investor’s submission of false 
information in connection with a public concession constituted a 
breach of good faith.191 It defined good faith as the “absence of deceit 
and artifice during the negotiation and execution of instruments that 
gave rise to the investment, as well as loyalty, truth and intent to 
maintain the equilibrium between the reciprocal performance of the 
parties.”192 The investor’s failure to act in such a fashion undermined 
the consent of the host state to ICSID jurisdiction.193 Moreover, the 
breach of good faith meant its investment was not made in 
accordance with the host state’s laws, which apparently incorporated 
the duty.194 
Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Bulgaria195 arose not under a BIT but 
under the multilateral Energy Charter Treaty,196 which does not 
contain an “in accordance” provision. The tribunal concluded that 
misrepresentation by the investor of its true ownership constituted 
“deliberate concealment amounting to fraud, calculated to induce the 
Bulgarian authorities to authorize the transfer of shares to an entity 
that did not have the financial and managerial capacities required to 
resume operation of the Refinery.”197 The tribunal imputed an 
obligation of good faith to Plama under both domestic198 and 
 
 191. Inceysa Vallisoletana, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award, ¶ 239. 
 192. Id. ¶ 231 (emphasis added). 
 193. Id. ¶¶ 237–38. 
 194. Id. ¶¶ 238–39. 
 195. Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award 
(Aug. 27, 2008), http://italaw.com/documents/PlamaBulgariaAward.pdf. 
 196. Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95; see Plama Consortium Ltd., 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award, ¶ 1. 
 197. Plama Consortium Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award, ¶ 135.  
 198. Id. ¶¶ 136, 144. As translated by Professor Metody Markov, who served as an expert in 
the Plama arbitration, Article 12 of Bulgaria’s Obligations and Contracts Acts (OCA) states 
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international law.199 It held the principle of good faith to encompass 
an “obligation for the investor to provide the host State with relevant 
and material information concerning the investor and the 
investment,” especially “when the information is necessary for 
obtaining the State’s approval of the investment.”200 
In sum, three principal legal justifications have supported the 
corruption defense: the concept of international (or transnational) 
public policy, the requirement that an investment be made in 
“accordance with laws,” and the obligation of the parties to act in 
good faith. The Inceysa tribunal seems to have incorporated notions 
of good faith and international public policy into the requirement that 
an investment be made in accordance with laws, but other case law 
suggests that these are indeed separate justifications that tribunals 
may invoke in the absence of an “in accordance” provision. 
C. Evidentiary Burden 
Although there is some uncertainty surrounding the details of 
the three rationales that have emerged in support of the corruption 
defense, ICSID jurisprudence is even murkier with regard to the 
evidentiary burden that each party should bear. At least one tribunal 
has applied a “clear and convincing evidence” standard,201 but others 
have failed to define a precise standard.202 It is unclear what standard, 
if any, will emerge as the rule among future tribunals. Tribunals have 
been reluctant to inquire deeply into allegations of corruption when 
further evidence may be available. When there have been ongoing 
domestic investigations into improper conduct, tribunals have not 
waited for the outcome of these investigations.203 For example, the 
Fraport tribunal refused a request by the respondent–host state for a 
stay of proceedings pending the outcome of investigations into the 
 
that “parties must negotiate and enter contracts in good faith.” Id. ¶ 136. Articles 27 and 29 of 
the OCA provide that contracts induced by fraud are subject to invalidation. Id. 
 199. Id. ¶ 144. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Siag v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award, ¶ 326 (June 1, 
2009), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0786_0.pdf. 
 202. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 203. E.g., Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶ 56 
(July 14, 2006), 14 ICSID Rep. 374 (2009); Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide v. 
Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Award, ¶¶ 5, 27 (Aug. 16, 2007), 
http://italaw.com/documents/FraportAward.pdf. 
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claimant’s allegedly corrupt conduct.204 Notably, most of the limited 
ICSID jurisprudence on the standard of proof has arisen from cases 
of fraud, as opposed to bribery.205 
1. Clear and Convincing Evidence.  The tribunal in Siag v. 
Egypt206 applied “the American standard of ‘“clear and convincing 
evidence,’” which lies “somewhere between the traditional civil 
standard of ‘preponderance of the evidence’ (otherwise known as the 
‘balance of probabilities’), and the criminal standard of ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt.’”207 The tribunal reasoned this was appropriate 
both because the claimant had adduced a great deal of prima facie 
evidence that he had not committed fraud and because serious 
allegations, such as fraud, demand a high standard of proof.208 
2. Undefined Standard.  Other tribunals have held that the 
evidence adduced by the respondent–host state has not been 
sufficient to support the corruption defense, but they have failed to 
define the precise burden that should be applied.209 They do agree, 
 
 204. Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Award, 
¶ 47 (quoting Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, 
Procedural Order No. 21, ¶ 17 (Jan. 6, 2006)). 
 205. In World Duty Free (the only case to grant the corruption defense for bribery), the 
claimant freely admitted to paying a bribe, so the tribunal had no chance to consider the 
appropriate standard of proof. See World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/00/7, Award, ¶ 130 (Oct. 4, 2006), 46 I.L.M. 339 (2007). 
 206. Siag v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award (June 1, 2009), 
http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0786_0.pdf. 
 207. Id. ¶ 325. 
 208. Id. ¶¶ 324–26. 
 209. Florian Haugeneder & Christoph Liebscher, Corruption and Investment Arbitration: 
Substantive Standards and Proof, in AUSTRIAN ARBITRATION YEARBOOK 2009, at 539,  549–50 
(Christian Klausegger et al. eds., 2009). In Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/98/4, Award (Dec. 8, 2000), 41 I.L.M. 896 (2002), the claimant made a number of 
suspiciously timed payments, totaling £52,000, to its agent in the host state. Id ¶ 71. Ultimately, 
the mere presence of suspicious payments to an intermediary was not enough to establish fraud, 
but the tribunal was unwilling to draw a precise line: “‘[T]he delicate problem[] remains for an 
arbitral tribunal ‘to determine precisely where the line should be drawn between legal and 
illegal contracts, between illegal bribery and legal commissions.’” Id. ¶ 111 (quoting Pierre 
Lalive, Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and International Arbitration, in 
COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION PRACTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY IN ARBITRATION 257, 277 
(Pieter Standers, ed., 1987)). Future tribunals may, however, be satisfied by evidence that the 
intermediary used that money to bribe officials of the host state. The tribunal in TSA Spectrum 
de Argentina S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/5, Award (Dec. 19, 2008), 48 
I.L.M. 496 (2009), held that the burden of proof is high for allegations of bribery, and that 
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however, that the burden is high: “An accusation of bribery requires 
the most rigorous level of proof.”210 One dissenting arbitrator argued 
for a lower standard of proof allowing tribunals discretion to make 
inferences based on “concordant circumstantial evidence,” but no 
tribunal has applied this standard.211 
D. Remedies 
A final question about the corruption defense concerns the 
remedies it affords. When a state succeeds in asserting the corruption 
defense, what form does the remedy granted by the tribunal take? 
Here, as elsewhere, the reasoning of tribunals has varied, and the 
precise remedy depends upon both the source of ICSID jurisdiction 
and the law applied by the tribunal. First, when an investor’s violation 
of a treaty-based “in accordance” provision gives rise to the defense, 
the remedy has been jurisdictional in nature.212 Because the investor’s 
activity does not qualify as an “investment” under the BIT (or other 
treaty), it cannot enjoy the protections granted by that document. The 
state’s general consent to ICSID arbitration is one such protection 
that the investor loses as a result of its corrupt conduct. Without the 
consent of both parties, ICSID cannot exercise jurisdiction over the 
dispute.213 
Second, even when an investment treaty does not contain an 
express “in accordance” provision, a tribunal may impute such a 
requirement to the treaty’s substantive protections. Corrupt conduct 
may thus cause an investor to lose the substantive protections of the 
 
“uncorroborated statements” and ongoing domestic criminal investigations do not satisfy that 
burden. Id. ¶¶ 172–75. 
 210. TSA Spectrum, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/5, Award, ¶ 172; see also Douglas Thomson, 
How To Deal with Corruption Allegations, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Nov. 15, 2013), 
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/32055/how-deal-corruption-allegations 
(“[A]llegations of corruption must be proved to a very high probability . . . .”). 
 211. Siag, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award, Dissenting Opinion of Professor Francisco 
Orrego Vicuña at 4 (quoting ABDULHAY SAYED, CORRUPTION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
AND COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION  93–94  (2004)). 
 212. See Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/25, Award, ¶ 404 (Aug. 16, 2007), http://italaw.com/
documents/FraportAward.pdf (holding that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the dispute); 
Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L. v. Republic of El Sal., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award, ¶¶ 335–
36 (Aug. 2, 2006), http://italaw.com/documents/Inceysa_Vallisoletana_en_001.pdf (same). 
 213. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States, supra note 22, art. 25(1), 17 U.S.T. at 1280, 575 U.N.T.S. at 175; see supra note 38 
and accompanying text. 
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treaty. The tribunal retains jurisdiction, but the investor’s claim loses 
on the merits because it has no rights to invoke under the treaty.214 
Finally, a tribunal may exercise jurisdiction over the dispute and 
hold that the investor’s corrupt conduct has rendered the contract 
voidable at the respondent–host state’s option. This was the 
conclusion reached by the tribunal in World Duty Free, in which 
ICSID’s jurisdiction was premised not upon a treaty but upon consent 
given in the investment contract.215 Importantly, the contract was not 
void ab initio; the respondent–host state was required to act to set it 
aside.216 The remedy was restitutio in integrum, which entailed 
returning the parties to their original positions, but did not include 
returning the bribe to the bribe payer.217 
This Part has traced the contours of the corruption defense as it 
has been applied by ICSID tribunals. It has focused on four principal 
inquiries. First, what is the nature of the wrongful conduct? Second, 
what law is applied by the tribunal? Third, what evidentiary burden is 
borne by the parties? And fourth, what is the appropriate remedy? 
These inquiries reveal that though the defense is in flux, it has certain 
characteristic elements that appear to be relatively static. 
III.  A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR FCPA-ICSID INTERACTION 
This Part seeks to reconcile the divergent goals of the 
international investment arbitration regime and the anticorruption 
regime. The following framework aims to prevent corruption while 
encouraging investment. It seeks to achieve this goal by promoting 
justice and transparency in situations in which the regimes intersect. 
This Part proposes that, in keeping with the current supply-side 
approach of the anticorruption regime, investors should be punished 
for their corrupt behavior. At the same time, FCPA enforcement 
authorities and ICSID tribunals should endeavor to ensure that 
neither the investor nor the host state reaps the rewards of its own 
corrupt behavior. 
 
 214. See Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award, 
¶¶ 97–98 (Aug. 27, 2008), http://italaw.com/documents/PlamaBulgariaAward.pdf. 
 215. World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, ¶ 6 
(Oct. 4, 2006), 46 I.L.M. 339 (2007). 
 216. Id. ¶¶ 164, 183. 
 217. Id. ¶¶ 164, 186. 
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A robust corruption defense in ICSID arbitration proceedings is 
an essential part of global efforts to stem the tide of corruption, 
especially in developing, capital-importing states. The common-law 
doctrine of unclean hands dictates that a claimant should not be 
permitted to enforce contracts procured by corrupt means,218 and 
ICSID tribunals have correctly followed similar logic in denying 
recovery to corrupt investors.219 Yet an FCPA investigation into an 
investor’s conduct only compounds the uncertainty created by the 
complexity of the defense and the lack of consistency among tribunals 
in applying it. At the root of the problem is a lack of coordination 
between the two overlapping regimes. Because no framework exists 
to govern communication between ICSID tribunals and domestic 
anticorruption authorities, two distinct problems may emerge when 
the corruption defense interacts with an FCPA investigation. 
First, ICSID arbitration may completely overlook covert 
corruption. The ICSID dispute-settlement system (in which investors 
are the claimants, states are the respondents, and monetary damages 
are the principal remedy) is not designed to ferret out covert 
corruption in the foreign-investment context, which is likely to be far 
more common than the open bribery seen in World Duty Free.220 The 
authorities tasked with investigating and enforcing domestic 
anticorruption statutes, such as the FCPA, are likely to be much more 
adept at rooting out corruption. Indeed, by uncovering evidence of 
covert corruption unknown to a prior ICSID tribunal, an FCPA 
 
 218. See Yackee, supra note 20, at 729 n.35 (“[U]nclean hands . . . ‘clos[es] the doors of a 
court of equity to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter in which 
he seeks relief, however improper may have been the behavior of the defendant.’” (quoting 
Adler v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 219 F.3d 869, 876–77 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
 219. See supra Part II.B. 
 220. See Andreas Kulick & Carsten Wendler, A Corrupt Way To Handle Corruption?: 
Thoughts on the Recent ICSID Case Law on Corruption, 37 LEGAL ISSUES ECON. 
INTEGRATION 61, 83 (2010) (“Needless to say, tribunals lack sufficient instruments and 
equipment to pursue criminal investigations . . . .”); cf. Gary Born, Bribery and an Arbitrator’s 
Task, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Oct. 11, 2011), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/
blog/2011/10/11/bribery-and-an-arbitrator’s-task (“Traditionally, arbitration was not perceived 
as an appropriate venue for adjudicating claims of bribery or corruption. The resistance to 
recognizing the arbitrability of bribery claims was based on a limited view of the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction, and included concerns about the tribunal’s restricted power to compel the 
production of evidence—particularly as compared with that of regulatory authorities that have 
traditionally investigated and prosecuted crimes of bribery—and the tribunal’s lack of authority 
to impose criminal penalties.”). But see Kulick & Wendler, supra, at 83. (“[H]owever, [tribunals] 
have enough leeway and leverage to find a fair and just result to the dispute.”). 
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investigation may reveal that the result reached by the tribunal was 
incorrect. Given the lack of an appeals process in ICSID arbitration,221 
it is unclear what recourse a respondent–host state might have in such 
circumstances. 
Second, the outcome of an FCPA investigation (a conviction, 
civil judgment, or prosecution agreement) may give host states an 
incentive to expropriate an investor’s assets.222 Depending on how 
much information is made public, a state could use the evidence of 
corruption uncovered by the investigation to invoke the corruption 
defense and thereby escape liability for expropriation. Awareness of 
this protection could embolden states to expropriate assets when they 
otherwise might not do so. This incentive is fueled in part by the 
award in World Duty Free, which did not impute to Kenya the 
culpable actions of the country’s own president.223 By recognizing the 
corruption defense for states whose officials solicit bribes, future 
ICSID tribunals would essentially permit corrupt host states to reap 
the rewards of their own misconduct. 
As made clear by Siemens and Fraport, the temporal relationship 
between FCPA and ICSID proceedings may affect what problems 
arise due to the regimes’ overlap.224 This Part divides this relationship 
into three distinct situations. First, ICSID arbitration may precede an 
FCPA investigation. In this case the danger of an incorrect ICSID 
award, such as in Siemens, is particularly acute. Second, an FCPA 
investigation may precede conduct giving rise to an ICSID claim. This 
scenario creates an incentive for host states to expropriate. Third, an 
FCPA investigation and ICSID proceedings may take place 
simultaneously, potentially giving rise to both dangers. 
 
 221. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.  
 222. See Torres-Fowler, supra note 1, at 998–1000 (noting that antibribery investigations and 
enforcement actions facilitate the use of the corruption defense by host states in arbitration 
actions against investors, which consequently allows the host state to emerge from arbitration in 
a net-positive position). 
 223. World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, ¶ 185 
(Oct. 4, 2006), 46 I.L.M. 339 (2007). 
 224. Cf. Bhojwani, supra note 18, at 89–90 (noting that disclosure of an FCPA violation may 
occur either before or after breach of contract by a “foreign contracting party” and identifying 
problems that may arise in each scenario). 
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A. ICSID First: Ensure Just Results Through Waiver and 
Disgorgement or by “Offsetting” ICSID Awards 
As Siemens demonstrated, when an arbitral award is issued 
before the commencement of an FCPA investigation, ICSID 
tribunals can come to incorrect conclusions because of a failure to 
uncover evidence of covert corruption.225 To protect against such 
incorrect results, FCPA enforcement authorities should require 
corporations to waive their ICSID claims as a condition of 
prosecution agreements.226 If an award has already been rendered and 
paid, the authorities should require the corporation to disgorge the 
award.227 Alternatively, the DOJ and SEC might consider offsetting 
FCPA penalties by the amount of a successful ICSID claim, but such 
a strategy suffers from several flaws.228 
1. Waiver/Disgorgement.  Following its FCPA settlement in 2008, 
Siemens waived its right to the $217 million award that it had won 
against Argentina.229 It is unclear, however, precisely why it did so. If 
Siemens decided independently to waive the award, that choice 
demonstrates just how much companies value their public image and 
how far they are willing to go to avoid reputational harm. If the 
waiver came as a condition of its FCPA settlement, then that may 
point to the DOJ’s willingness to make this a normal condition of plea 
and prosecution agreements. 
Regardless of whether Siemens waived the award of its own 
volition or whether it was forced to do so pursuant to its FCPA 
settlement, its forfeiture of the award appears to be a normatively 
desirable result. If the tribunal had been aware of all the facts, it 
almost certainly would have recognized a corruption defense in favor 
of Argentina.230 Alternatively, had the FCPA investigation never 
occurred, Siemens would have succeeded in reaping the benefits of its 
own corrupt conduct by exploiting the dispute-resolution provisions 
of a treaty the protections of which it was not entitled to enjoy. 
 
 225. See supra Part III. 
 226. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 227. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 228. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 229. Peterson, supra note 12. 
 230. In the one instance in which a claimant freely admitted to bribery, the tribunal 
recognized the defense. See supra note 205. For an explanation of the various rationales for 
recognizing the defense, see supra Part II.B. 
LOSCO IN PP CLEAN (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/26/2014  7:24 PM 
2014] STREAMLINING THE CORRUPTION DEFENSE 1235 
 
Accordingly, to ensure correct outcomes in the future, the DOJ and 
SEC should require investors to waive their rights to ICSID awards 
(or to disgorge awards already paid) as a condition of prosecution 
agreements. In conformity with the maxim restitutio in integrum, the 
claimant’s waiver of an award restores the parties to the positions 
they would have enjoyed had the respondent–host state succeeded in 
asserting the corruption defense.231 The DOJ and SEC should not 
object to implementing such a requirement, as it would aid the 
FCPA’s ultimate goal of fighting corruption. 
When a respondent–host state has already paid an award, the 
funds might be used in a number of ways. The disgorged award could 
be forfeited to the investigating country’s government, used to 
implement changes to reporting and bookkeeping practices within the 
claimant corporation, or placed into an anticorruption fund to 
support anticorruption efforts in the host state. The best solution 
might incorporate several of these elements, based on the prosecuting 
authorities’ best judgment in the individual situation. Alternatively, 
the investor could return the funds to the host state, but doing so 
would achieve the same result as if the tribunal had recognized the 
host state’s corruption defense. This would essentially permit the 
state to reap the benefits of its corrupt conduct. By using its discretion 
to tailor the remedy to the particular situation, the DOJ can help 
achieve the most just result in the given circumstances.232 
2. Offsetting.  One commentator has proposed that FCPA 
penalties be offset by the amount an investor loses in arbitration.233 
This proposal entails reducing the violator’s FCPA penalty by the 
amount of its failed ICSID claim in the event that the host state 
invokes the corruption defense. The proposal is attractive because it 
seeks to temper the price paid by corrupt investors so that the 
combined effect of the FCPA and the corruption defense do not act 
as a deterrent to foreign direct investment. It could, however, 
potentially undermine the FCPA’s supply-side approach to 
 
 231. World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, 
¶¶ 164, 186 (Oct. 4, 2006), 46 I.L.M. 339 (2007). 
 232. Increasing the DOJ’s discretion to enforce the FCPA may not always be viewed 
favorably, but a discussion of the normative value of increased DOJ discretion is beyond the 
scope of this Note. The DOJ’s discretion could always be corralled by legislative enactment or 
by an official memorandum setting new guidelines for FCPA enforcement. 
 233. E.g. Bhojwani, supra note 18, at 111. 
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corruption. Both parties to mutual corruption are culpable, and 
capitulating to investors could do more harm than good by weakening 
the appearance of certainty attached to FCPA sanctions. 
The argument in favor of offsetting rests on an assumption that 
criminal penalties and settlements for FCPA violations are 
fundamentally the same as the loss of investment assets due to 
expropriation. This is not the case. A tribunal’s recognition of the 
corruption defense is not a monetary penalty against the investor, 
albeit the defense may have significant monetary consequences. 
Rather, the investor forfeits the protection it once enjoyed under an 
investment treaty. Even then, the investor would not be completely 
without recourse, as it would still have access to the domestic courts 
of the host country. This return to the pre-BIT status quo may not be 
an appealing option (especially in a country where corruption is 
prevalent), but it reinforces the FCPA’s supply-side approach by 
acting as a further deterrent to engaging in corrupt activity. 
Offsetting penalties might create an incentive for companies to 
actively overstate their claims (even more so than they might 
already). What if the amount of the investor’s claim is greater than 
the FCPA penalty that would be assessed? If the entire claim were 
offset, a company’s only punishment would be the expropriation of 
their investment, with no FCPA fine at all. When the investor pleads 
guilty to violations, this arrangement would at least undermine the 
punitive value of FCPA sanctions. The same holds true when the 
investor signs a prosecution agreement. Though these mechanisms 
allow investors to avoid a criminal conviction, they do still hold some 
punitive value. 
B. FCPA First: Counteract the Incentive To Expropriate by 
Mandating an Opportunity for Cure or by Concealing 
Enforcement Actions 
When an FCPA investigation reveals that an investor has 
corruptly procured an investment contract, the corruption defense 
creates a perverse incentive for the host state to expropriate the 
investor’s assets by offering the state immunity from claims.234 Host 
states might also attempt to renegotiate the investment contract to 
 
 234. See supra notes 222–23 and accompanying text. 
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insert burdensome new terms, secure in the knowledge that they are 
protected by the corruption defense.235 
Because the SEC and DOJ generally bear different burdens of 
proof, however, host states may have different incentives depending 
on which agency pursues the action. The SEC need only prove 
corruption by a preponderance of the evidence in a civil suit,236 
whereas the DOJ must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in a 
criminal prosecution.237 Although it is unclear what standard of proof 
an ICSID tribunal would apply, the standard would likely be high. A 
tribunal may or may not follow the Siag tribunal’s lead and apply a 
“clear and convincing evidence” standard.238 A criminal conviction for 
bribery or a DPA containing an admission of guilt might be 
convincing or at least highly persuasive to a tribunal, whereas a civil 
judgment under a lesser standard of proof will likely carry less weight. 
This raises the possibility that a prior criminal conviction will provide 
a host state with greater incentive to expropriate, whereas a civil 
judgment will render it less confident in its ability to mount a 
successful corruption defense. Regardless of the standard, evidence 
uncovered in the course of FCPA investigations may tempt 
unscrupulous host states to try their luck, knowing that the worst-case 
scenario entails reimbursing the investor for the expropriated assets. 
 
 235. See Bhojwani, supra note 18, at 106 (“The settlement may enable the foreign 
contracting party to breach the contract, renegotiate its terms, threaten to reopen proceedings, 
or present the FCPA violation as evidence for an arbitral tribunal considering a breach of 
contract claim.”). Because a voidable contract (as opposed to a contract void ab initio) remains 
valid unless the state takes action to set it aside, states may have an incentive to renegotiate 
contracts following FCPA settlements. A state could use the threat of expropriation to strong-
arm investors into providing additional consideration or accepting burdensome new terms. 
Investors who refuse to accept those terms might face expropriation of their investments with 
little chance for recourse. In such a scenario, it might be prudent for the U.S. government to put 
diplomatic pressure on the host country to accept reasonable terms. If the ICSID award came 
first, the renegotiation might include return of the award in whole or in part, depending on the 
DOJ’s assessment of the culpability of the state. This situation illustrates the utility of a BIT 
provision requiring a state to accept compensation for actual harm resulting from the 
corruption. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 236. McSorley, supra note 89, at 754 n.30. 
 237. See Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 877 (2007) 
(“In criminal law . . . [a] corporate defendant has the right to a grand jury, to a jury trial, to be 
found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and to protection under the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.”). 
 238. See supra Part II.C. 
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1. Opportunity for Cure.  One potential solution would be to 
mandate an opportunity for the investor to cure its breach of the 
investment contract. The United States could easily amend its Model 
BIT239 to include a provision stating that, when bribery would 
otherwise render a contract voidable or unenforceable, the host state 
relinquishes any claim to the corruption defense upon payment of 
damages to the host state for all actual harm incurred as a result of 
the corruption. These damages could be assessed in conjunction with 
any criminal fines or disgorgement penalties.240 Compliance with this 
requirement could become a standard provision of prosecution 
agreements, and the details of such compliance would most likely 
need to be outlined in an official DOJ memo updating the FCPA 
enforcement guidelines. Although amending existing BITs to include 
cure provisions would likely be more difficult, the United States could 
also apply diplomatic pressure on host states to gain their 
acquiescence. Alternatively, individual investors could negotiate cure 
provisions into their investment contracts. 
The main advantage of such provisions is that they would negate 
host states’ incentive to expropriate following an FCPA violation, 
ensuring both that investors retain access to a neutral forum for 
protecting their assets and that unscrupulous host states do not 
benefit from their own wrongdoing. However, investors would have 
to cooperate with anticorruption authorities to benefit from cure 
provisions. Otherwise, they would remain vulnerable to expropriation 
by host states. This would act as a strong incentive to ensure full 
cooperation with FCPA investigations. 
2. Conceal FCPA Enforcement Actions.  Another potential 
solution, albeit a less desirable one, is to keep FCPA enforcement 
actions secret. The DOJ could refuse to share any evidence with an 
ICSID tribunal when the expropriation occurs after the FCPA 
settlement (as long as the company is still on good behavior). It could 
 
 239. As its name suggests, the Model BIT is a model text used as the basis for negotiating 
new BITs. See Bilateral Investment Treaties and Related Agreements, U.S. DEP’T ST., 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/index.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2014). The State Department and 
the U.S. Trade Representative, working in conjunction with other agencies, most recently 
updated the Model BIT in 2012. Id. 
 240. In practice, actual injury resulting from bribery might be difficult to assess. In the event 
that no actual damages can be calculated, a cure provision could, for example, provide for the 
payment of nominal damages or a contribution to an anticorruption fund in the host state. 
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then retain the threat of publicizing such evidence as leverage to 
ensure the investor’s full cooperation and future FCPA compliance. 
Alternatively, it could include a clause in the prosecution agreement 
stating that the settlement is neither an admission nor a judicial 
determination of guilt. 
In keeping with the principle of restitutio in integrum and the 
doctrine of unclean hands,241 prosecution-agreement signatories 
should be required to agree not to bring an ICSID claim against the 
host state for any expropriation that has already occurred. Because 
the investor engaged in corrupt activity, it should not be permitted to 
invoke the protections of a BIT for claims arising from that activity. 
International public policy, good faith, and any applicable “in 
accordance” provisions instruct that the investor must forfeit the 
treaty’s protections.242 The DOJ could give teeth to this obligation by 
threatening to release evidence to the arbitral tribunal in the event 
that the investor does bring a claim. Although such an approach 
might prevent host states from utilizing FCPA enforcement actions as 
signals to expropriate, it would introduce further opacity into the 
application of the FCPA, and for that reason might not be desirable. 
C. Simultaneous Proceedings: Ensure Correct Arbitral Awards by 
Encouraging Investors To Stay ICSID Claims Pending the Results 
of FCPA Investigations 
A third scenario encompasses situations in which FCPA 
investigations and arbitral proceedings take place simultaneously. 
Fraport serves as an example of such a case in which documents from 
a corruption investigation could have been extremely useful to an 
ICSID tribunal in deciding the outcome of arbitration proceedings, 
but were not handed over. In Fraport, the Philippines requested a 
stay of the proceedings pending the outcome of corruption 
investigations.243 The Philippines ultimately prevailed because 
Fraport’s investment was not made in accordance with Philippine law, 
but information uncovered in a corruption investigation could have 
 
 241. See World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, 
¶¶ 164, 186 (Oct. 4, 2006), 46 I.L.M. 339 (2007). 
 242. See supra Part II.B. 
 243. Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/25, Award, ¶ 47 (Aug. 16, 2007), http://italaw.com/documents/FraportAward.pdf. 
The tribunal did not grant the request. Id. (quoting Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. 
Worldwide, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Procedural Order No. 21, ¶ 17 (Jan. 6, 2006)). 
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given it another avenue to victory. This situation underscores one 
advantage of the FCPA over ICSID proceedings: although ICSID 
tribunals do have the legal power to compel production of 
documents, that power is different from the investigatory power 
vested in the DOJ, SEC, and FBI under the FCPA. 
It should be an uncontroversial assertion that the FBI is capable 
of uncovering evidence that may escape an arbitral tribunal’s notice 
entirely. So as to benefit from the investigative resources of the 
bodies tasked with FCPA enforcement, ICSID tribunals should make 
it their policy to ask for—and the DOJ should be prepared to make—
recommendations about whether to stay proceedings pending an 
FCPA outcome. At the same time, the DOJ should encourage 
claimants to stay their arbitration claims. This would permit domestic 
anticorruption authorities—in the United States and elsewhere—to 
conduct a full investigation, the results of which could inform the 
outcome of the ICSID claim. ICSID proceedings could resume 
following the conclusion of the FCPA investigation. In this way, a 
tribunal could conceivably enlist any number of domestic 
anticorruption authorities as “detectives” to ensure that an award is 
rendered based on accurate and complete facts. Those authorities 
should gladly lend their assistance because ICSID awards based on 
correct information will reward honest investors while punishing 
corrupt ones.244  
Notably, the Fraport tribunal’s refusal to grant a stay, as 
requested by the Philippines, indicates that future tribunals may be 
reluctant to grant stays requested by respondent–host states.245 
However, tribunals should be more willing to grant a stay requested 
by the claimant because the claimant could ultimately decide to drop 
its claim anyway. In the wake of Siemens, they should be especially 
eager to collect as much information as possible so as to assure they 
reach correct decisions. 
FCPA enforcement authorities may take different steps 
depending on the outcome of the investigation. When an FCPA 
investigation uncovers no evidence of corruption, the DOJ, for 
 
 244. Such fact-finding could potentially be a costly endeavor. Any costs arising from 
expediting an investigation or producing evidence to a tribunal could be borne by the parties to 
the ICSID dispute. 
 245. See Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, 
Award, ¶ 47 (explaining the tribunal’s denial of the stay request and its perception that the 
record was sufficient). 
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example, could recommend to the tribunal that nothing was found. 
Moreover, it could leverage such a recommendation of innocence to 
obtain cooperation from investors, conditioning a favorable report on 
the investor’s full cooperation. When an investigation does uncover 
evidence of corruption, the DOJ may understandably hesitate to 
share that evidence with a tribunal. Instead, the DOJ could require 
the investor to drop its arbitration claim as part of a prosecution 
agreement, thereby achieving a just outcome and rightly depriving the 
investor of BIT protection. If Siemens is any guide, investors will 
almost certainly comply out of fear of the reputational harm that can 
accompany a criminal conviction.246 
CONCLUSION 
As the number of FCPA enforcement actions and ICSID 
arbitration claims has exploded in recent years, interplay between the 
two regimes has become more frequent. However, the lack of 
coordination between the two regimes creates problems for the 
normative effectiveness of each. This Note has outlined the rough 
contours of the emerging corruption defense as applied by ICSID 
tribunals, including the evidentiary burden placed upon the host state 
for asserting the defense. It has also addressed two significant 
problems that have manifested in recent ICSID cases. First, as 
Siemens demonstrated, incorrect arbitral decisions can result from a 
lack of evidence of corruption in the formation of investment 
contracts. Second, the corruption defense creates a perverse incentive 
for states to expropriate investors’ assets following FCPA 
investigations. This Note has proposed a framework for FCPA-ICSID 
interaction designed to solve these problems by strengthening the 
corruption defense and promoting justice and transparency. 
To ensure that investors do not reap the rewards of their own 
corrupt conduct, when an ICSID award in favor of the investor 
precedes an FCPA investigation, FCPA enforcement authorities 
should require the investor to waive or disgorge the award. Likewise, 
to avoid harmful opportunism by host states, when an FCPA 
settlement precedes ICSID arbitration, the investor should be 
allowed to cure the contract by reimbursing the host state for any 
 
 246. See Weiss, supra note 68, at 511–12 (noting the harsh impact of reputational damage 
stemming from a criminal conviction). 
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actual harm resulting from the corruption. Finally, to ensure that 
ICSID awards are based on the best possible evidence, when ICSID 
and FCPA proceedings are simultaneous, the domestic enforcement 
authorities should encourage the investor to stay its arbitration claim 
pending the outcome of the FCPA investigation. The DOJ and SEC 
should be prepared to make recommendations to the arbitral tribunal 
about whether a stay would be advisable. In the end, the mechanisms 
outlined herein will contribute to the eradication of corruption and 
the achievement of just results in investment-arbitration claims and 
will help to resolve some of the glaring uncertainties posed by the 
lack of coordination between ICSID proceedings and FCPA 
enforcement actions. 
